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Theoretical Indeterminacy, Pluralism and the Conceptual Concrete

University Of Victoria

Metaphysical pluralism is examined as a proposed explanation for theoretical indeterminacy in psychology and found wanting. A more promising view is that indeterminacy is caused by a methodological inadequacy that can be overcome by a revised understanding of abstraction in theory construction. The revision involves a genetic or historical approach to concept formation that reveals the concrete interrelations among qualities so that they can be ordered with respect to deductive priority.

Theory & Psychology, Vol. 1, No. 2, 147-162 (1991)
DOI: 10.1177/0959354391012001


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